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An Enterprise (No-Fault) Liability 
Suitable for Judicial Adoption—with         
a “Draft Judicial Opinion” 
  
VIRGINIA E. NOLAN*                                                                               
EDMUND URSIN** 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In this Article we propose that courts recognize an enterprise liability 
applicable to persons injured on the premises of supermarkets.  In contrast 
to strict products liability, victim compensation under our proposal would 
not turn on whether the supermarket’s premises could be characterized 
as dangerously defective.  Instead, the proposed doctrine would impose a 
strict enterprise liability for personal injuries arising out of the use of the 
supermarket’s premises by entrants on those premises.  The resulting doctrine 
would avoid the intractable—and litigation producing—defect problem, 
while holding down costs—and litigation—by limiting recoverable 
damages.  Thus the doctrine would achieve, within the common law 
 
 *  Class of 1975 Professor, University of San Diego School of Law.  B.S. 1969, Russell Sage College; J.D. 1972, Albany Law School; LL.M. 1975, George Washington University.  **  Professor of Law, University of San Diego School of Law.  A.B. 1964, J.D. 1967, Stanford University. The Authors are grateful to Bob Fellmeth, Hugh Friedman, Neil Levy, Jeffrey O’Connell, and Maimon Schwarzschild, who read and commented on this Article in draft form, and the University of San Diego School of Law for research support.  They also benefited from research assistance from Sierra Damm, Jason Najor, Cormac Kehoe, and Drew Bordages. 
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framework, the benefits of third-party no-fault compensation plans, described 
by the 1991 American Law Institute Reporters’ Study on Enterprise 
Responsibility for Personal Injury as a “better blend” of “efficient 
compensation, economical administration, and effective [accident] 
prevention.”1 
Our proposed supermarket enterprise liability is supported by case law 
that has shaped contemporary tort law.  This case law includes the 
decisions adopting and refining the law and policies of strict products 
liability, decisions abolishing the contributory negligence rule and 
adopting comparative negligence (thereby cutting back on damages), 
expansive negligence decisions, and decisions questioning the award of 
damages for intangible, nonpecuniary loss.  This case law—and its 
support for our proposed doctrine—is presented in the “draft judicial 
opinion” in Part III of this Article. 
We recognize that the policies supporting our proposed supermarket 
enterprise liability could support broader enterprise (no-fault) proposals.2  
But, as Fleming James recognized a half century ago, proposals for 
judicial, as opposed to legislative, adoption fare better if they are less 
sweeping, so that they fit within a “process of growth well within the 
framework of our common law tradition.”3  We believe that our draft 
judicial opinion demonstrates that adoption of a supermarket enterprise 
liability meets this criterion.  Before presenting that opinion, however, 
we turn in Section II to a discussion of that common law tradition—and 
the jurisprudential pedigree that is the predicate for the judicial 
lawmaking role implicit in our proposal. 
II.  THE JURISPRUDENTIAL PEDIGREE 
The conception of the judicial lawmaking role that supports adoption 
by courts of an enterprise (no-fault) liability approach is rooted in the 
tradition of the great judges who have shaped, and continue to shape, our 
 
 1. 1 AM. LAW INSTITUTE, REPORTERS’ STUDY: ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL INJURY 35 (1991) [hereinafter 1 ALI REPORTERS’ STUDY]; 2 AM. LAW INSTITUTE, REPORTERS’ STUDY: ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL INJURY 534 (1991) [hereinafter 2 ALI REPORTERS’ STUDY].  2. VIRGINIA E. NOLAN & EDMUND URSIN, UNDERSTANDING ENTERPRISE LIABILITY: RETHINKING TORT REFORM FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 168–77 (1995); Edmund Ursin, Strict Liability for Defective Business Premises—One Step Beyond Rowland and Greenman, 22 UCLA L. REV. 820 (1975); Jeffrey O’Connell, Expanding No-Fault 
Beyond Auto Insurance: Some Proposals, 59 VA. L. REV. 749, 773 (1973); see also Virginia E. Nolan & Edmund Ursin, Strict Tort Liability of Landlords: Becker v. IRM Corp. in Context, 23 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 125 (1986) (discussing Becker v. IRM Corp. 698 P.2d 116, 116 (Cal. 1985) (adopting doctrine of landlord strict tort liability)).  3. Fleming James, Jr., General Products—Should Manufacturers Be Liable 
Without Negligence?, 24 TENN. L. REV. 923, 924 (1957). 
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law: Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Justice 
Roger Traynor, and Judge Richard Posner.  Stated most simply, when it 
comes to the common law, this conception of the judicial role holds that 
it is the job of judges to continually reshape the law in order to meet, in 
Holmes’s words, the “felt necessities of the time.”4  As Judge Posner has 
succinctly written, an “appellate judge has to decide . . . whether to 
apply an old rule unmodified, modify and apply the old rule, or create 
and apply a new one.”5  In this process, the goal is making the choices 
that will produce “the best results for the future.”6 
This conception of the judicial lawmaking role can be traced to Chief 
Justice Shaw of Massachusetts, who during his thirty year tenure, from 
1830 to 1860, shaped the common law—including the tort law—of his 
time.  Shaw, for example, wrote Brown v. Kendall,7 the cornerstone of 
negligence law, and in Farwell v. Boston & Worcester Railroad Corp.8 
adopted the fellow servant rule and the defense of assumption of the 
risk.  In these, and in a myriad of other decisions, the essence of Shaw’s 
view of the judicial role was that judges should adapt the common law to 
the felt needs of American society. 
Holmes shared Shaw’s vision of the judicial role and wrote that “the 
strength of that great judge lay in [his] accurate appreciation of the 
requirements of the community . . . [and in his] understanding of the 
grounds of public policy to which all laws must ultimately be referred.”9  
Perhaps the most striking articulation of this perspective is found in 
Holmes’s The Path of the Law,10 which Judge Posner has called 
Holmes’s greatest essay.11  Writing in 1897, the same year that England 
enacted its workers’ compensation legislation, Holmes suggested that 
courts might reconsider the requirement that employees prove negligence in 
cases involving injuries received in the course of their employment.  He 
wrote that “even now our theory upon this matter is open to 
 
 4. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 5 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1963) [hereinafter HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW].  5. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY 248–49 (1999) [hereinafter POSNER, PROBLEMATICS]. 
 6. Id. at 241.  See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY (2003) [hereinafter POSNER, DEMOCRACY].  7. Brown v. Kendall, 60 Mass. (6 Cush.) 292 (1850).  8. Farwell v. Boston & Worcester R.R. Corp., 45 Mass. (1 Met.) 49 (1842).  9. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW, supra note 4, at 85.  10. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897) [hereinafter Holmes, Path].  11. POSNER, PROBLEMATICS, supra note 5, at vii. 
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reconsideration, although I am not prepared to say how I should decide 
if a reconsideration were proposed.”12 
Holmes is perhaps most identified with his famous 1906 dissent in 
Lochner v. New York13 and his warning against the danger of judicial 
“activism.”  Lochner-style activism, however, involved constitutional 
decisions, with courts cutting back on the power of the legislature.  No 
such restriction on legislative power occurs when courts adopt, modify, 
or revise common law rules.  Thus, for Holmes, there was no inconsistency 
in calling for deference to the legislature in constitutional decisionmaking 
while insisting on a creative role for courts when it came to the common 
law.  Indeed, he addressed both themes in The Path of the Law. 
Nevertheless, by the time Justice Traynor commenced his thirty-year 
tenure on the California Supreme Court in 1940, the clear vision of the 
creative role of the common law judge held by Shaw and Holmes had 
become obscured by the revulsion over Lochner-style activism.  Thus 
scholars largely ignored Traynor’s 1944 proposal in Escola v. Coca Cola 
Bottling Co. that courts adopt a doctrine of strict products liability.  
Moreover, by the 1950s, the “legal process” school of jurisprudence had 
become dominant in the academy, and scholars had generalized their 
Lochner-inspired concerns over judicial activism (in constitutional law) 
to include the common law.14  These scholars insisted that judicial lawmaking 
be confined to “reasoned elaboration [from] existing arrangements,”15 
that it strive to be “neutral,”16 “nonpolitical,”17 and “noncontroversial.”  
Fearing “the specter of runaway social engineering with ill-considered 
emphasis on risk-spreading capacity,”18 legal process scholars objected 
that “a sharp change in our system of compensation of accidental 
injuries, shifting from the present system with its premise of liability 
based on fault to a system based on the premise of loss distribution or 
insurance, is beyond the sphere of desirable judicial creativity.”19  
 
 12. Holmes, Path, supra note 10, at 467.  13. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (holding unconstitutional, under the Due Process Clause, a New York state law limiting work hours in bakeries to sixty per week and ten per day).  14. Edmund Ursin, Judicial Creativity and Tort Law, 49 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 229, 230–43, 286 (1981) [hereinafter Ursin, Judicial Creativity]. 
 15. See generally HENRY M. HART, JR., & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 398 (Tentative ed. 1958).  16. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 17 (1959).  17. ROBERT E. KEETON, VENTURING TO DO JUSTICE: REFORMING PRIVATE LAW 43–44 (1969).  18. Robert E. Keeton, Conditional Fault in the Law of Torts, 72 HARV. L. REV. 401, 444 (1959).  19. Robert E. Keeton, Creative Continuity in the Law of Torts, 75 HARV. L. REV. 463, 508 (1962). 
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Applied to the prospect of courts adopting a strict products liability 
doctrine, this meant that a “legitimate basis of criticism” exists “when 
courts take the bold step toward imposing and justifying strict products 
liability without legislative authorization and assistance.”20 
Justice Traynor responded to this legal process handwringing in his 
extrajudicial writings of the 1950s and 1960s.  Building on the 
foundation laid by Holmes and Shaw, Traynor urged that “[c]ourts have 
a creative job to do when they find that a rule has lost its touch with 
reality and should be abandoned or reformulated to meet new conditions 
and new moral values.”21  Indeed, “[t]he real concern [was] not the remote 
possibility of too many creative opinions but their continuing scarcity.”22  
Moreover, attempts by legal process scholars to invent “magic words”23 
to restrict judicial creativity overlooked the reality of “legislative 
indifference or legislative sensitivity to political considerations.”24  It was 
simply “unrealistic to expect that legislators [would] close their heterogeneous 
ranks for the single-minded purpose of making repairs and renewals in 
the common law.”25  Thus, according to Traynor, courts have “the major 
responsibility for lawmaking in the basic common-law subjects,”26 for 
“the recurring formulation of new rules to . . . displace the old,” and for the 
“choice of one policy over another.”27 
Judge Richard Posner began his academic career just as Justice 
Traynor retired from the bench in 1970.  Upon appointment to the bench 
in 1980, Posner turned his attention to the lawmaking role of courts, 
publishing numerous articles and a trilogy of books that appeared in the 
1990s.28  Unlike academics of the “post-Legal Process” era who “spun” 
 
 20. Richard E. Speidel, The Virginia “Anti-Privity” Statute: Strict Products 
Liability Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 51 VA. L. REV. 804, 845 n.103 (1965).  21. Roger J. Traynor, Law and Social Change in a Democratic Society, 1956 U. ILL. L.F. 230, 232; see also Ursin, Judicial Creativity, supra note 14, at 243–50 (1981) (discussing Traynor’s view of judicial lawmaking).  22. Roger J. Traynor, Comment, in LEGAL INSTITUTIONS TODAY AND TOMORROW 48, 52 (Monrad G. Paulsen ed., 1959) [hereinafter Traynor, Comment].  23. Roger J. Traynor, No Magic Words Could Do It Justice, 49 CAL. L. REV. 615, 616 (1961) [hereinafter Traynor, Magic Words]. 
 24. Id. at 618. 
 25. Id.; see also Roger J. Traynor, Statutes Revolving in Common-Law Orbits, 17 CATH. U. L. REV. 401, 402 (1968).  26. Traynor, Magic Words, supra note 23, at 618.  27. R. J. Traynor, The Courts: Interweavers in the Reformation of Law, 32 SASK. L. REV. 201, 213 (1967). 
 28. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEM OF JURISPRUDENCE (1990); RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY (1999); RICHARD A. POSNER, 
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legal process themes to achieve their substantive agendas,29 Posner 
placed himself squarely in the Holmesian tradition.  For example, he 
describes his 1999 book, The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory, 
as “an extended homage to Holmes’s ideas.”30  The goal of the book, he 
writes, is to “push the engine a bit farther along.”31 
Echoing Holmes’s famous “[t]he life of the law has not been logic: it 
has been experience,”32  Posner writes that the judge “can do no better 
than to rely on notions of policy, common sense, personal and 
professional values, and intuition and opinion, including informed or 
crystallized public opinion.”33  In explicitly embracing (and refining) 
this Holmesian view of judicial lawmaking, which he calls pragmatic 
adjudication, Posner’s main focus is not primarily on the common law.  
Nevertheless, he writes that “in this country, common law judges reserve 
the right to ‘rewrite’ the common law as they go along.”34  And, in doing 
this, the wise judge would be “inclined to start with [the sources that 
would guide his policy choices] to decide . . . the approach that would be 
best” in a substantive area.35  Moreover, concerns that the creative 
common law role of courts might infringe upon legislative prerogatives 
(as is the case in constitutional adjudication) are misplaced because 
when courts adopt a common law rule, the “legislature can always step 
in” to prescribe an alternative rule if it disagrees with the judge-made 
law.36  Indeed, in the common law “a heavy burden of legal creativity 
falls inescapably on the shoulders of judges” because “American 
legislatures . . . are so sluggish when it comes to correcting judicial 
mistakes.”37  These words might well have been written by Justice 
 
OVERCOMING LAW (1995).  29. Ronald Dworkin, for example, has insisted—in line with legal process scholarship—that courts decide cases based on legal principles, not policy.  See, e.g., Ronald M. Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 14, 22–23 (1967).  But his “principles” often mirror the policies used by courts to justify doctrines such as strict products liability and market share liability in DES cases.  See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, In 
Praise of Theory, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 353, 356 (1997) (justifying market share liability based on a principle that “when misfortunes happen as an almost inevitable consequence of some valuable commercial enterprise . . . the loss should . . . be distributed among the class of those who profit from the enterprise”).  30. POSNER, PROBLEMATICS, supra note 5, at vii. 
 31. Id.  32. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW, supra note 4, at 5.  33. POSNER, PROBLEMATICS, supra note 5, at viii. 
 34. Id. at 259. 
 35. Id. at 246. 
 36. Id. at 247.  An example of such an interaction is the legislative overturning of the California Supreme Court’s holding that social hosts who furnish alcoholic beverages to obviously intoxicated persons could be liable to third persons injured by the intoxicated person.  See Neil M. Levy & Edmund Ursin, Tort Law in California: At the 
Crossroads, 67 CAL. L. REV. 497, 511 (1979).  37. POSNER, PROBLEMATICS, supra note 5, at 247. 
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Traynor, who, forty years earlier, wrote: 
The real concern is not the remote possibility of too many creative opinions but their continuing scarcity.  The growth of the law, far from being unduly accelerated by judicial boldness, is unduly hampered by a judicial lethargy that masks itself as judicial dignity with the tacit approval of an equally lethargic bar. . . .  Massive anachronisms endure . . . , their venerability discouraging judges from voicing the rude possibility that they may have reached retirement age.38 
The views of both resonate with the legal historian Willard Hurst’s 
description of the great men in law as those who have had an ability “to 
express their time or foretell the generation to come. . . .  [T]hey saw 
better where the times led and took their less imaginative, less flexible, 
or less courageous brethren in that direction faster and with a minimum 
of waste and suffering.”39 
This, then, is the jurisprudential pedigree for the lawmaking role that 
is the predicate for the adoption by courts of our proposed supermarket 
enterprise liability doctrine.  In Section III of this Article, we present a 
“draft judicial opinion” that demonstrates “the capacity of the ablest in 
the judiciary to improve their creation of . . . tort liability,” by addressing 
the “three crushing and intertwined liabilities of tort liability itself . . .  
its uncertainties, delays, and transaction costs . . . .”40  Adoption of this 
doctrine would serve the “deterrent and compensatory objectives of tort 
law”41 by providing a “better blend” of “efficient compensation, economical 
administration, and effective [accident] prevention,”42 and thus address 
“tort law’s essential shortcomings.”43 
We close this section with a reminder to those who remain skeptical 
 
 38. Traynor, Comment, supra note 22, at 53.  39. JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW: THE LAW MAKERS 17–18 (1950).  Judge Posner has written that the “most influential judges . . . change the law or . . . make new law where there was none before . . . . “  POSNER, DEMOCRACY, 
supra note 6, at 85–86.  Judge Henry Friendly wrote of Justice Traynor that “no other judge of his generation matched Traynor’s combination of comprehensive scholarship, sense for the ‘right’ result, craftsmanship, and versatility.”  Henry J. Friendly, Ablest 
Judge of His Generation, 71 CAL. L. REV. 1039, 1040 (1983).  In a similar vein, Judge Posner has written that Judge Friendly “was the greatest federal appellate judge of his time—in analytic power, memory, and application perhaps of any time.”  Richard A. Posner, In Memoriam: Henry J. Friendly, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1709, 1724 (1986).  40. Jeffrey O’Connell, Commentary: Judges and Real Tort Reform Concerning 
Uncertainty, Delays and Transaction Costs, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 497, 497 (1999).  41. POSNER, PROBLEMATICS, supra note 5, at 254.  42. 1 ALI REPORTERS’ STUDY, supra note 1, at 35; 2 ALI REPORTERS’ STUDY, 
supra note 1, at 534.  43. O’Connell, supra note 40, at 501. 
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that a court might abandon the defect requirement and fault-based 
defenses and limit damages—despite possibly finding our proposed 
doctrine substantively desirable.44  In this regard, it is instructive to recall 
that leading scholars of an earlier generation thought it inconceivable 
that courts would adopt doctrines of strict products liability and 
comparative negligence virtually on the eve of their adoption.  Prosser, 
for example, wrote in 1960, the year Henningsen45 was decided, that 
judicial adoption of a general doctrine of strict products liability was so 
“radical and disruptive” that it might “very possibly be the law of fifty 
years ahead.”46  Similarly, Clarence Morris, another leading torts scholar 
of the time,47 wrote in 1965 that there was “no substantial likelihood that 
any court will act today . . . to [adopt] comparative negligence.”48  
Indeed, this seemed so obvious to Morris that he asserted that “lawyers 
will not even consider arguing [the] possibility [of judicial adoption of 
comparative negligence] to a court.”49  And Prosser concluded in 1971 that there was little likelihood of that occurring50—only to be proven 
wrong two years later when the Florida Supreme Court did just that51 
and was quickly followed by the California52 and Alaska Supreme 
Courts.53 
In our view, courts are quite capable of adopting enterprise (no-fault) 
liability approaches as a “natural and easy extension” of existing 
doctrine.54  They did just that in extending strict products liability from 
food to products generally.  And the following draft judicial opinion 
illustrates how, in a similar manner, courts could adopt a supermarket 
enterprise liability doctrine. 
 
 44. Scholars who favor legislative compensation plans tend to assume that courts are “stuck with the administrative apparatus of [traditional] tort law, [including] the rules of damages,” see STEPHEN D. SUGARMAN, DOING AWAY WITH PERSONAL INJURY LAW 36 (1989); 1 ALI REPORTERS’ STUDY, supra note 1, at 29–30, and a requirement of negligence (or defectiveness).  1 ALI REPORTERS’ STUDY, supra note 1, at 29.  45. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960).  46. William L. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the 
Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1120 (1960). 
 47. See  WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE 
OF TORT LAW 5 n.14 (1987).  48. PAUL J. MISHKIN & CLARENCE MORRIS, ON LAW IN COURTS 256 (1965). 
 49. Id.  50. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 434–35 (4th ed. 1971). 
 51. See Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431, 438 (Fla. 1973) (adopting comparative negligence). 
 52. See Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 532 P.2d 1226, 1243 (Cal. 1975) (holding that “all-or-nothing” rule of contributory negligence should be superceded by a system of “pure” comparative negligence). 
 53. See Kaatz v. State, 540 P.2d 1037, 1049 (Alaska 1975) (replacing the doctrine of contributory negligence with the principle of comparative negligence).  54. James, supra note 3, at 924. 
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III.  A DRAFT ENTERPRISE (NO-FAULT) LIABILITY “OPINION”55 
 IN RE SUPERMARKET ENTERPRISE                            (NO-FAULT) LIABILITY 
In this opinion we consider appeals from two cases.  In one case the 
plaintiff slipped and fell in defendant’s supermarket on a green bean.  
Because the plaintiff was rendered unconscious by her fall and 
bystanders focused on the plaintiff’s condition, no one was able to 
describe the condition of the green bean.  The trial court dismissed the 
complaint on the ground that plaintiff was unable to prove the length of 
time the green bean had been on the floor prior to her injury—and thus 
in the trial court’s view was unable to prove the defendant supermarket 
had constructive notice of the dangerous condition of the floor. 
In the second case plaintiff, a small child, was injured when the 
shopping cart, in which he was seated, tipped over, causing him to hit his 
head on the floor.  The plaintiff claimed that the shopping cart’s 
defective design caused it to tip over.  His action against defendant 
supermarket is based on strict products liability.  The trial court 
dismissed this claim on the ground that defendant supermarket did not 
manufacture, sell, or lease the shopping cart, and thus is outside the 
chain of marketing and distribution of the product and not subject to 
strict products liability. 
In this appeal, plaintiff in the slip and fall case argues that the trial 
court’s dismissal of the complaint is inconsistent with this court’s recent 
decision in Ortega v. Kmart Corp. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1200, 114 
Cal.Rptr.2d 470, 36 P.3d 11, in which we held that a plaintiff need not 
establish how long a dangerous condition existed prior to injury in order 
to establish constructive notice of the dangerous condition.  In Ortega, 
we concluded that evidence of the owner’s failure to inspect the 
 
 55. This draft opinion is written in the style of a California Supreme Court opinion, drawing primarily on California case law to illustrate doctrinal and policy themes.  The California Supreme Court has played a pathbreaking role in the development of tort law for more than four decades.  Its decisions have served as the starting point for courts that have followed—and at times rejected—its lead.  Compare Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 878–79 (Alaska 1979) (adopting California’s two-prong defective design test) with Shanks v. Upjohn Co., 835 P.2d 1189, 1194 (Alaska 1992) (rejecting California’s exemption of prescription drugs from scrutiny under the two-prong defective design test).  See also Posecai v. Wal-Mart Stores, 752 So. 2d 762, 767–68 (La. 1999) (following Ann M. v. Pac. Plaza Shopping Ctr., 863 P.2d 207, 213–15 (Cal. 1993)). 
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premises within a reasonable period of time is sufficient to allow an 
inference that the condition was on the floor long enough to give the 
owner the opportunity to discover and remedy it.  With our Ortega 
decision we joined the growing number of jurisdictions that have 
responded to the unfairness of imposing on accident victims the 
sometimes impossible burden of proving how long prior to an injury a 
dangerous condition existed. 
Our approach in Ortega resembles what has been called the “mode of 
operation” rule, under which a supermarket that can reasonably 
anticipate that dangerous conditions (such as littered aisles) will 
regularly arise must anticipate and must exercise reasonable care to 
guard against those dangers (by, for example, frequently inspecting its 
aisles).  (See, e.g., Sheil v. T.G. & Y. Stores Co. (Mo. 1989) 781 S.W.2d 
778, 780.)  Under the mode of operation rule, the precise time that an 
object has been in the aisle is not controlling—and constructive notice 
itself need not be established.  (Ibid.) 
Defendant objects that our Ortega holding and similar approaches 
allow juries to impose what would be, in effect, strict liability.  A green 
bean, for example, might have fallen in the aisle two minutes before 
plaintiff slipped on it.  Yet if the store only inspected the aisles every 
hour and a jury was to conclude that the aisles should have been 
inspected every half hour, liability could be imposed even though the 
store’s negligence may not have caused the accident.  In other words, a 
“storekeeper’s failure to inspect the premises does not necessarily lead to 
the conclusion that the dangerous condition existed long enough that he 
would have discovered it had he acted reasonably to inspect the 
premises.”  (Winegar, Comment, Reapportioning the Burden of Uncertainty: 
Storekeeper Liability in the Self-Service Slip-and-Fall Case (1994) 41 
UCLA L.Rev. 861, 878 (hereafter Winegar, Reapportioning the Burden 
of Uncertainty).)  Thus commentators have concluded that these rules 
sanction “imposing something close to strict liability.”  (Schwartz, The 
Beginning and the Possible End of the Rise of Modern American Tort 
Law (1992) 26 Ga. L.Rev. 601, 652 (hereafter Schwartz, Modern Tort 
Law).)  We note that a similar objection was considered in our Ortega 
decision.  We wrote at the time that “neither . . . social and economic 
consequences, nor scholarly criticisms suggest [our Ortega] rule is 
unsound or unworkable.”  (Ortega v. Kmart Corp., supra, 26 Cal.4th at 
p. 1211, 114 Cal.Rptr.2d 470, 36  P.3d 11.) 
In the shopping cart case, plaintiff points out that it is “hornbook law” 
that strict liability applies to business premises that fall within the 
“license to use” category of strict products liability.  A leading case is 
the Court of Appeal decision in Garcia v. Halsett (1970) 3 Cal.App.3d 
319, 321–322, 82 Cal.Rptr. 420, in which plaintiff was injured when his 
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hand was caught in an allegedly defective washing machine at a 
laundromat.  In holding that the operator was subject to strict products 
liability, the court wrote that although defendant “is not engaged in the 
distribution of the product, in the same manner as a manufacturer, 
retailer or lessor, he does provide the product to the public for use by the 
public, and consequently does play more than a random and accidental 
role in the overall marketing enterprise of the product in question.”  (Id. 
at 326, 82 Cal.Rptr. 420.) 
In tacitly approving the Garcia holding, our court has characterized 
Garcia as holding that the owner of the launderette, “‘in the same 
manner as a manufacturer, retailer, or lessor,’ was strictly liable in tort.”  
(Pike v. Frank G. Hough Co. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 465, 476, 85 Cal.Rptr. 
629, 467 P.2d 229 [citing Garcia v. Halsett, supra, 3 Cal.App.3d at p. 
326].)  Plaintiff asserts that defendant supermarket should likewise be 
subject to strict liability, arguing that the use of a shopping cart is like 
the use of a washing machine.  Defendant supermarket counters that the 
laundromat case is distinguishable.  In fact, Prosser and Keeton sees it 
as “quite different” because the laundromat is “engaged in the very 
business of licensing the use of property on their premises and charging 
for that use.”  (Prosser & Keeton on Torts (5th ed. 1984) p. 719.) 
In these appeals we adopt a supermarket enterprise liability doctrine 
that makes it unnecessary for us to pursue the areas of dispute described 
above.  Under this doctrine, supermarkets are liable (but with damages 
limitations) for personal injuries arising out of the use of their premises 
by visitors to those premises.  The doctrine covers both the slip-and-fall 
and shopping cart cases since the injuries in each of those cases arose 
out of the use of supermarket premises. 
The supermarket enterprise liability rule we adopt derives from the 
doctrine and policies of strict products liability.  As we will explain, the 
doctrinal framework exists for this rule, which is a natural and easy 
extension of existing precedent.  We take this occasion, however, to 
reassess the policies of victim compensation, loss spreading, and 
prevention of accidents, upon which strict products liability has been 
premised, in light of the scholarly literature that has developed since our 
early landmark deployment of these policies.  We find many of the 
criticisms of these policies to be sound.  We conclude, however, that we 
should adjust, not abandon, these tort policies.  As we will explain, these 
policies, when adjusted, support our application of strict liability to 
supermarkets, but only in a modified form.  Thus we hold that 
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supermarkets are subject to a strict enterprise liability for personal 
injuries arising out of the use of their premises by visitors to those 
premises.  Under this doctrine, victim compensation is not dependent on 
proof of defect (or negligence), recoverable damages are limited, and 
victim-fault defenses are eliminated.  As we will explain, each of these 
adjustments in doctrine is supported by precedent, as well as policy.  Our 
supermarket doctrine, better termed supermarket enterprise liability, will 
achieve the “better blend” of “efficient compensation, economical 
administration, and effective prevention” that is the hallmark of a fair, 
balanced tort regime.  (See American Law Institute, 1 Reporters’ Study: 
Enterprise Responsibility for Personal Injury (1991) p. 35 [hereafter 1 ALI 
Reporters’ Study]; American Law Institute, 2 Reporters’ Study: 
Enterprise Responsibility for Personal Injury (1991) p. 534 [hereafter 2 
ALI Reporters’ Study].)  (Our recognition of a supermarket enterprise 
liability does not necessarily preclude the retention of a residual cause of 
action for what Albert Ehrenzweig called “reprehensible conduct” under 
which traditional tort damages would be available.  (See Ehrenzweig, 
Negligence Without Fault (1966) 54 Cal. L.Rev. 1422, 1428 (hereafter 
Ehrenzweig, Negligence).  See also O’Connell & Robinette, The Role of 
Compensation in Personal Injury Tort Law: A Response to the Opposite 
Concerns of Gary Schwartz and Patrick Atiyah (1999) 32 Conn. L.Rev. 
137, 150.)) 
1.  The Doctrinal Framework Supporting Supermarket Strict Liability 
Beginning with our 1963 Greenman decision, this court has applied 
the strict products liability doctrine in situations in which the underlying 
policies of loss spreading and accident prevention supported its 
application.  (See Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc. (1963) 59 
Cal.2d 57, 27 Cal.Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 897.)  Thus we quickly, and 
without dissent, endorsed the application of strict liability to 
manufacturers, retailers, wholesalers, and lessors of products.  (See 
generally Prosser & Keeton, supra, at p. 719–720.)  Describing the 
extension to lessors, Prosser and Keeton notes that the “policy 
arguments in support of strict liability—accidental prevention, enterprise 
risk-shifting capacity and difficulties of proving negligence—have 
especial relevance to the rental agency.”  (Id. at p. 718.)  According to 
Prosser and Keeton, it is also “hornbook” law that strict liability applies 
to business premises cases that fall within the “license to use” and 
“hybrid sales-service” categories of strict products liability.  (Id. at pp. 
719–720.)  Thus strict liability applies to a laundromat when a washing 
machine malfunctions, Garcia v. Halsett, supra, 3 Cal.App.3d 319, 82 
Cal.Rptr. 420, or a beauty parlor when a defective permanent wave 
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solution is applied to a patron.  (Newmark v. Gimbel’s Inc. (1969), 54 
N.J. 585, 258 A.2d 697.)  It would seem a small step to apply a broader 
business premises strict liability to cases that fail to fit precisely into the 
“license to use” and “hybrid sales-service” categories.  Thus Professor 
Stephen Sugarman has asked: “[I]f the roof falls in or a shelf falls over 
in a Wal-Mart store, would it not be as appropriate to invoke a concept 
of ‘defective premises’ . . . as it is to invoke strict liability against 
General Motors for one of its defective Buicks?”  (Sugarman, A 
Restatement of Torts (1992) 44 Stan. L.Rev. 1163, 1194.)  We think that 
it would. 
The authors of Prosser and Keeton assert that the use of a washing 
machine in a laundromat is “quite different” from the use of a shopping 
cart in a supermarket because the laundromat is “engaged in the very 
business of licensing the use of property on [its] premises and charging 
for that use.”  (Prosser & Keeton, supra, at p. 719.)  Of course, 
supermarket patrons also are charged for the use of shopping carts, albeit 
indirectly through grocery prices.  We are unimpressed by the Prosser 
and Keeton distinction, which, if taken seriously, would distinguish 
shopping carts in grocery stores from luggage carts at airports (where a 
fee is directly charged).  Moreover, we note that strict liability has been 
imposed in shopping cart cases.  (Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Nest-Kart (1978) 
21 Cal.3d 322, 146 Cal.Rptr. 550, 579 P.2d 441.) 
The Prosser and Keeton authors insist on their distinction because, in 
their view, there is “little, if any, difference between using a defective 
shopping cart and using a slippery floor.”  (Prosser & Keeton, supra, at 
p. 719.)  We agree, but our conclusion is that strict liability should be 
applied to both.  Professor Gary Schwartz has noted that “in one line of 
[slip and fall] cases that has acquired prominence since the early 1980s, 
courts have perceived that self-service retail stores involve a ‘mode of 
operation’ that is especially likely to generate litter.”  (Schwartz, Modern 
Tort Law, supra, at pp. 651–652.)  He reported that these cases “can 
permissibly be read as imposing something close to strict liability.”  (Id. 
at p. 652.)  Moreover, a 1994 analysis building on Schwartz’s work 
suggests that as many as ten jurisdictions had by that date reached 
similar results.  (Winegar, Reapportioning the Burden, supra, at pp. 
888–891.)  And as our Ortega decision demonstrates, the number of 
jurisdictions adopting similar approaches continues to grow.  (Ortega v. 
Kmart Corp., supra, 26 Cal.4th 1200, 114 Cal.Rptr.2d 470, 36 P.3d 11.)  
These cases suggest a judicial willingness to impose strict liability in slip 
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and fall cases, thus obviating the need for the strained distinctions 
required by the Prosser and Keeton analysis.  The cases also suggest that 
courts might wish to single out self-service retail stores for the 
application of strict liability. 
As we will explain, in this case we adopt such a doctrine, but limit it 
to supermarkets, while also modifying traditional strict liability by 
eliminating the defect requirement and fault-based defenses and 
modifying damages rules.  First, however, we assess the policy bases on 
which our rule rests. 
2.  Reevaluating the Policies of Strict Liability 
While the doctrinal framework exists for the application of strict 
liability in cases of supermarket accidents, the crucial question is 
whether such a strict liability rule would be sound as a matter of social 
policy.  As noted, the primary policies on which that framework was 
built are the compensation of accident victims, spreading losses over 
society, and the increased safety incentives that a strict liability rule 
would induce. 
In recent years, however, each of these policy justifications has been 
called into question.  It is, therefore, necessary to assess whether the 
policy basis for strict liability remains viable. 
a.  Victim Compensation and Loss Spreading 
In recent years tort critics have argued that the prevalence of first-
party insurance has obviated the need for compensation through the tort 
system.  These critics also assert that tort law is a flawed vehicle for 
providing whatever compensation is needed for accident victims who are 
uninsured or underinsured.  The 1991 American Law Institute 
Reporters’ Study, for example, asserted that the “use of tort law as a 
device for expanding insurance protection against disabling injuries 
is . . . questionable . . . .”  (1 ALI Reporters’ Study, supra, at p. 30.) 
Contemporary critics of the victim compensation and loss spreading 
goals argue that compensation through the tort system is overgenerous 
because it includes large awards for pain and suffering, and because the 
collateral source rule permits recovery of amounts covered by first-party 
insurance.  (Id. at p. 29; Priest, Modern Tort Law and Its Reform (1987) 
22 Val. U. L.Rev. 1, 15 (hereafter Priest, Tort Law and Its Reform); 
Schwartz, The Ethics and the Economics of Tort Liability Insurance 
(1990) 75 Cornell L.Rev. 313, 361 (hereafter Schwartz, Tort Liability 
Insurance).)  Moreover, tort awards are based on the size of a victim’s 
prior earnings, although everyone, rich and poor alike, pays the same 
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price for products and services.  Thus, tort liability has a regressive 
distributional effect.  (1 ALI Reporters’ Study, supra, at p. 30; Priest, 
Tort Law and Its Reform, supra, at pp. 17–18; Schwartz, Tort Liability 
Insurance, supra, at p. 361.) 
Critics also argue that tort law is incapable of providing compensation 
swiftly and efficiently.  Even strict products liability requires that a 
product be proven defective, and experience has shown that this 
determination may result in a balancing of risks and benefits similar to 
negligence law and (especially when combined with determinations of 
victim fault and pain and suffering damages) produce litigation and 
delay.  (2 ALI Reporters’ Study, supra, at p. 39.)  These realities lead 
critics to conclude that the tort system is expensive, inefficient, and 
incapable of producing the assurance of prompt compensation that is 
implicit in the loss spreading goal. 
We believe that these criticisms have merit, but they point not to a 
rejection of the loss spreading and victim compensation policies, but to 
an adjustment in their application.  Specifically, they point to the 
elimination of the defect requirement (and fault-based defenses) and to a 
limitation on recoverable damages in a strict (enterprise) liability regime. 
We note at the outset, however, that the claim that existing first-party 
insurance provides sufficient compensation for accident victims (see 
Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law (1987) 96 
Yale L.J. 1521, 1586–1587) is unpersuasive and not supported by 
empirical data.  The ALI Reporters’ Study found that in 1991 “[a]t least 
30 million individuals in this country [were] without insurance for health 
care.”  (1 ALI Reporters’ Study, supra, p. 156.)  By 1999, the figure was 
43.4 million, and by the end of 2003 stood at 43.5 million.  (See Kilborn, 
Uninsured in U.S. Span Many Groups, N.Y. Times (Feb. 26, 1999) p. 
A1; Brownstein, Shortsighted States Are Putting Health Care on the 
Chopping Block, L.A. Times (Dec. 22, 2003) p. A13.)  Moreover, the 
Reporters’ Study notes that “another 10 to 20 million [were] 
significantly underinsured.”  (1 ALI Reporters’ Study, supra, at p. 156.) 
The Reporters’ Study concludes that “[i]t would be rash . . . to dismiss 
out of hand the role that tort damage awards play in providing a form of 
health care insurance for the victims of enterprise injuries.”  (Ibid.)  
Moreover, “an even starker gap [in the social safety net] confronts 
people who lose earnings due to injury.”  (Id. at p. 44.)  With respect to 
disability and life insurance, the study reports that “[d]isability 
insurance—particularly long-term disability insurance—is not widespread.”  
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(Id. at p. 163.)  Furthermore, “life insurance . . . probably does not 
provide a substantial economic cushion to the families of most 
breadwinners upon their death[s].”  (Ibid).  Thus, the Reporters’ Study 
concludes that “compensation paid to the victims of injury . . . from all 
sources is far from adequate.”  (Ibid.) 
We also believe that tort law, specifically the supermarket strict 
enterprise liability we are adopting, is an appropriate vehicle to deliver 
the compensation that is needed.  First, as we will discuss in detail 
below, the defect requirement and fault-based defenses should be 
discarded in the supermarket enterprise liability doctrine, thus removing 
one obstacle to prompt, efficient compensation through the tort system.  
The traditional damages award should also be modified in order to 
assure prompt compensation, and, as we next discuss, remove the 
overgenerous and regressive aspects of tort awards. 
We agree with tort critics that the prevalence of first-party insurance 
and the regressive distributional effect of tort liability call for a 
rethinking of the role of victim compensation and loss spreading in tort 
law.  In our view, however, an adjustment in the application of these 
policies, not their rejection, is the consequence of this rethinking. 
The need for victim compensation, for example, does not necessarily 
justify the existing tort damages award in an enterprise liability regime 
that provides the assurance of victim compensation.  In fact, the scholars 
whose scholarship provided the foundation for the judicial adoption of 
strict products liability linked their proposed strict liability to limitations 
on recoverable damages—including the elimination or limitation of 
recovery for pain and suffering and an abolition of the traditional 
collateral source rule.  (See, e.g., James, Damages in Accident Cases 
(1956) 41 Cornell L.Q. 582; 2 Harper & James, The Law of Torts (1956) 
§ 25; James, Some Reflections on the Bases of Strict Liability (1958) 18 
La. L.Rev. 293.  See generally Ehrenzweig, Negligence, supra, at p. 
1423; Jaffe, Damages for Personal Injury: The Impact of Insurance 
(1953) 18 Law and Contemp. Probs. 219; Plant, Damages for Pain and 
Suffering (1958) 19 Ohio St. L.J. 200.) 
Justice Traynor, the architect of this court’s strict liability regime, 
dissenting in the 1961 case of Seffert v. L.A. Transit Lines (1961) 56 
Cal.2d 498, 509, 15 Cal.Rptr. 161, 364 P.2d 337 (dis. opn. of Traynor, 
J.), urged courts to recognize the damages implications of the enterprise 
liability theory by limiting the size of damage awards for pain and 
suffering.  Echoing Professor Jaffe, Traynor wrote that damages for pain 
and suffering “become increasingly anomalous as emphasis shifts in a 
mechanized society from ad hoc punishment to orderly distribution of 
losses through insurance and the price of goods or of transportation.”  
(Id. at p. 511).  Like Jaffe and James, Traynor did not see courts as 
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powerless to limit pain and suffering awards.  He suggested in Seffert 
that, as a general guideline, “ordinarily the part of the verdict attributable 
to pain and suffering does not exceed the part attributable to pecuniary 
losses.”  (Id. at p. 512). 
b.  Safety Incentives 
A decade after our Greenman decision, law and economics scholars, 
most notably (now Judge) Richard Posner, cast doubt on the claim that a 
strict liability regime creates safety incentives superior to those existing 
under negligence law.  Prior to Posner’s writing, it had been widely 
assumed that strict liability created greater safety incentives because, for 
example, a business enterprise “forced to bear all accident costs . . . will 
have an incentive to find the optimal accident level for [its] product.”  
(Franklin, Tort Liability for Hepatitis: An Analysis and a Proposal 
(1972) 24 Stan. L.Rev. 439, 462.  See also Baxter & Altree, Legal 
Aspects of Airport Noise (1972) 15 J.L. & Econ. 1 [presenting an 
economic analysis of the problem of airport noise].) 
Posner, however, demonstrated that “[e]conomic theory provides no 
basis, in general, for preferring strict liability to negligence, or 
negligence to strict liability.”  (Posner, Strict Liability: A Comment 
(1973) 2 J.L. Studies 205, 221 (hereafter Posner, A Comment).)  Thus, 
contrary to a decade of thinking, economic analysis failed to establish 
any reason to move toward a regime of strict liability rules.  (Now 
Judge) Guido Calabresi had responded to Posner’s position by arguing 
that in practice, as opposed to theory, strict liability would optimize 
accident costs.  (See Calabresi & Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict 
Liability in Torts (1972) 81 Yale L.J. 1055, 1059.)  Posner’s retort was 
that Calabresi had established only that the “question whether a general 
substitution of strict [liability] for negligence . . . would improve 
efficiency [is] at this stage hopelessly conjectural; the question is at 
bottom empirical and the empirical work has not been done.”  (Posner, A 
Comment, supra, at pp. 211–212.) 
The theoretical debate continues to this day, with economic analysis 
yielding wildly divergent conclusions in the hands of leading law and 
economics scholars.  For some, the efficiency premise points to absolute 
manufacturer liability without a defect requirement.  (See generally 
Croley & Hanson, Rescuing the Revolution: The Revived Case for 
Enterprise Liability (1993) 91 Mich. L.Rev. 683 [discussing strict 
liability and negligence standards] (hereafter Croley & Hanson, 
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Rescuing the Revolution).)  For others, it points to a negligence rule  
(See, e.g., 2 ALI Reporters’ Study, supra, at pp. 15–16 [discussing 
product design defects]) or even rules more restrictive than negligence. 
(Compare Epstein, The Unintended Revolution in Product Liability Law 
(1989) 10 Cardozo L.Rev. 2193, 2206–2212, and Priest, Tort Law and 
Its Reform, supra, at pp. 23–33, with Croley & Hanson, Rescuing the 
Revolution, supra, at pp. 727, 370 [stating that Epstein’s  “prescription 
translates to a proposal that courts should return to . . . a standard 
approaching (the Winterbottom rule)” and that “Priest’s arguments 
strongly suggest that courts should adopt a mutable, absolute consumer 
liability regime . . . .”].) 
As Professor Gregory Keating has recently observed, “[e]conomics 
supplies us with a complex and indeterminate framework, and it permits 
a variety of approaches to any particular problem.”  (Keating, The Idea 
of Fairness in the Law of Enterprise Liability (1997) 95 Mich. L.Rev. 
1266, 1281.  See also Moorhouse et al., Law & Economics and Tort 
Law: A Survey of Scholarly Opinion (1998) 62 Alb. L.Rev. 667, 694 
(1998) [reporting that “no grand consensus about (the efficiency of) 
common law tort rules” emerged from the authors’ survey of members 
of the American Law and Economics Association].) 
Fortunately, in appraising our new doctrine of defect-free strict 
liability we do not need to rely on economic theory.  The application of 
our strict (enterprise) liability rule to supermarkets imposes a liability 
regime similar to workers’ compensation plans, which also limit 
damages and do not require negligence or a defect as a predicate to 
compensation. 
While the debate among tort theorists has been over the deterrence 
differences between tort doctrines of strict liability and negligence, the 
ALI Reporters’ Study points out that workers’ compensation, in addition 
to providing “social insurance for guaranteed compensation,” 1 ALI 
Reporters’ Study, supra, at page 121, “has been carefully designed to 
enhance the battery of incentives trained on employers.”  (Id. at p. 122.)  
The “expectation is that . . . [the incentives created by workers’ 
compensation] will, over a period of time, lead to a safer and healthier 
workplace.”  (Id. at pp. 122–123.)  Turning from theory to empirical 
studies of the safety effects of workers’ compensation, the study reports 
that the “most thorough and sophisticated analysis of this problem” 
(Moore & Viscusi, Compensation Mechanisms for Job Risks: Wages, 
Workers’ Compensation, and Product Liability (1990) pp. 33–36) has 
determined that “the existence of [workers’ compensation] at its current 
level of benefits has [had] a powerful safety effect, reducing workplace 
fatality rates alone by 25 percent from what they would have been if the 
system was not  in place.”  (1 ALI Reporters’ Study, supra, at p. 124.  
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See also, Dewees et al., Exploring the Domain of Accident Law: Taking 
the Facts Seriously (1996) 353 [relying in part on Moore & Viscusi, 
supra, and noting that the operation of workers’ compensation reduces 
worker injury rates more than the tort system would].)  The Reporters’ 
Study concludes that these plans have “a powerful safety effect” that 
stems “from the fact that . . . compensation is provided through a 
liability system that requires a causal connection between an employee’s 
injury and a particular employer’s operation.”  (1 ALI Reporters’ Study, 
supra, at pp. 124–125.  See Abraham, The Forms and Functions of Tort 
Law (2d ed. 2002) p. 242.) 
The Reporters’ Study concludes that liability systems based on the 
workers’ compensation (third-party liability) model—which our new 
doctrine is—offer a “better blend,” 1 ALI Reporter’s Study, supra, at p. 
35, of “efficient compensation, economical administration, and effective 
[accident] prevention.”  (2 ALI Reporter’s Study, supra, at p. 534.)  
Negligence law may efficiently achieve the injury prevention goal, as 
might strict liability, but no one claims that it also gives the promising 
blend of “efficient compensation [and] economical administration” that 
no-fault provides. 
3.  Defect, Damages, and Defenses Precedents 
Some who agree with the substance of our elimination of the defect 
requirement and reformulation of damages law might object that these 
reforms are so unprecedented that we should refrain from taking these 
steps.  In our view, however, each of these reforms is the logical 
extension of the case law that has evolved in the decades since 
Greenman. 
a.  Elimination of the Defect Requirement 
In contrast to strict products liability, victim compensation under our 
supermarket enterprise liability doctrine would not turn on whether an 
enterprise’s premises could be characterized as “dangerously defective.”  
Instead, the doctrine would impose a strict enterprise liability for 
personal injuries arising out of the use of such business premises by 
entrants on those premises.  The simplest answer to the claim that this 
doctrine is an unprecedented change in the law of strict liability is that 
the hazardous activity strict liability doctrine, which dates back to 
Rylands v. Fletcher (1868) 3 L.R.-E. & I. App. 330, already dispenses 
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with a defect requirement.  And, just as in the case of our doctrine, the 
application of this doctrine is largely to premises cases.  Dispensing with 
a defect requirement is also the logical extension of our treatment over 
the years of the defect requirement in products cases—and of the 
enterprise liability theory out of which strict products liability grew. 
For the first half of this century, the primary focus of enterprise 
liability scholars such as Fleming James was on proposals for 
automobile compensation plans.  Inspired by the enactment of workers’ 
compensation legislation, these scholars envisioned legislatures meeting 
the problem of the automobile accident with a similar solution.  (See 
Nolan & Ursin, Understanding Enterprise Liability: Rethinking Tort 
Reform for the Twenty-First Century (1995) chs. 3–8.)  Only after it 
became clear in the 1940s that special interests (first insurance 
companies, and then trial lawyers) had more influence in the legislative 
process than a good idea thought out and articulated by legal scholars, 
did enterprise liability scholars turn to the common law—and then only 
belatedly to strict products liability.  (Id. at chs. 12–14.)  Strict products 
liability and no-fault compensation plans are thus aspects of a broader 
enterprise liability theory, and they were recognized as such by their 
proponents.  It is significant, therefore, to note that compensation plans 
not only dispense with the negligence requirement, but also do not 
require defectiveness as a prerequisite for compensation. 
When scholars in the 1950s wrote about, and our court in 1963 
adopted, the doctrine of strict products liability, the defect requirement 
lurked in the background.  While it was clear to those scholars and to our 
court that the new doctrine was not simply a variation of negligence law, 
negligence concepts have, at times, crept into scholarly writings and 
judicial opinions.  But, as we have repeatedly emphasized, the policies 
of strict liability are antithetical to negligence concepts. 
The most appropriate point of departure in analyzing the defect issue 
is in the writing of the judicial architect of strict products liability—
Justice Traynor.  Just as Justice Traynor’s 1944 Escola opinion proved 
prophetic with its proposal of strict products liability, Escola v. Coca 
Cola Bottling Co. (1944) 24 Cal.2d 453, 461–468, 150 P.2d 436 (conc. 
opn. of Traynor, J.), so did his 1965 article, addressing the defect issue, 
point us in the direction in which we have now moved.  (Traynor, The 
Ways and Meanings of Defective Products and Strict Liability (1965) 32 
Tenn. L.Rev. 363, 375 (hereafter Traynor, Ways and Meanings).) 
Shortly after Justice Traynor authored the seminal opinion in 
Greenman, supra, 59 Cal.2d 57, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 897, which 
adopted strict products liability, he addressed the defect issue in that 
1965 article.  In that article Traynor linked the recently adopted strict 
products liability with the “strict liability . . . for industrial injuries 
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covered by workmen’s compensation, and for injuries caused by ultra-
hazardous activities.”  (Traynor, Ways and Meanings, supra, at p. 375.)  
In that context, he anticipated that the defect requirement might unduly 
impede victim compensation.  He thus suggested the possibility that 
strict liability might be applied to products for which no safer alternative 
is available, products “whose norm is danger.”  (Id. at p. 368.) 
Specifically, Traynor suggested the possibility of imposing strict 
liability on prescription drug manufacturers for allergic reactions, 
writing that “[t]he inevitable query is whether a manufacturer should 
provide for the occasional risk of allergy as a cost of doing business.”  
(Id. at p. 369.  See also James, The Untoward Effects of Cigarettes and 
Drugs: Some Reflections on Enterprise Liability (1966) 54 Cal. L.Rev. 
1550, 1558.)  More generally, Traynor advised that “[t]he complications 
surrounding the definition of a defect suggest [an] inquiry as to whether 
defectiveness is the appropriate touchstone of liability.”  (Traynor, Ways 
and Meanings, supra, at p. 372.) 
This court’s case law over the decades has reflected the tensions 
pointed out by Justice Traynor and points to the soundness of his 
suggestion that defectiveness is not the proper touchstone of liability.  In 
our 1969 decision in Pike v. Frank G. Hough Co., supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 
475, 85 Cal.Rptr. 629, 467 P.2d 229, we held that strict liability applied 
in design cases, and, as part of our opinion, explained our holding by 
writing that there exists “no rational distinction between design and 
manufactur[ing defects], since a product may be equally defective and 
dangerous if its design subjects protected persons to unreasonable risk as 
if its manufacture does so.”  The “unreasonable danger” language was 
borrowed from the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A.  The 
problem—not perceived at the time—was that if a product were 
considered defective only if found to be unreasonably dangerous, strict 
liability would be barely distinguishable from the negligence standard. 
Since Pike, this court has repeatedly held that our strict liability 
doctrine is intended to be and is more expansive than negligence law.  
For example, in our 1972 decision in Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp. 
(1972) 8 Cal.3d 121, 104 Cal.Rptr. 433, 501 P.2d 1153, we quickly set 
the record straight.  In reaffirming that strict liability applied to design 
defects, we wrote that the “unreasonably dangerous” language crept into 
our jurisprudence without fanfare.  (Id. at p. 129.)  Because in practice 
that requirement “rarely leads to a different conclusion than would have 
been reached under laws of negligence,” we wrote that a plaintiff need 
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merely prove “that there was a defect in the manufacture or design of the 
product and that such defect was a proximate cause of the injuries.”  (Id. 
at p. 133.) 
In Barker v. Lull Engineering Co. (1978) 20 Cal.3d 413, 143 Cal.Rptr. 
225, 573 P.2d 443, decided in 1978, we further refined our approach to 
the design defect issue.  In doing so we noted Dean Wade’s criticism of 
the consumer expectations test—that, at times, a “consumer would not 
know what to expect, because he would have no idea how safe the 
product could be made,” id. at page 430 (quoting Wade, On the Nature 
of Strict Tort Liability for Products (1973) 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 829)—but 
did not, as Dean Wade had suggested, abandon that test.  Instead, we 
concluded that the consumer expectations test should not be “the 
exclusive yardstick for evaluating design defectiveness.”  (Barker v. Lull 
Engineering Co., supra, at p. 430 [emphasis added].) 
Thus, we offered a two-prong test, the first prong of which was the 
consumer expectations test: “[A] product may be found defective in 
design if the plaintiff establishes that the product failed to perform as 
safely as an ordinary consumer would expect when used in an intended 
or reasonably foreseeable manner.”  (Id. at pp. 432.)  We then 
recognized an alternative definition of defectiveness: “[A] product may 
be found defective in design, even if it satisfies ordinary consumer 
expectations, if through hindsight the jury determines that the product’s 
design embodies ‘excess preventable danger,’ or, in other words, if the 
jury finds the risk of danger inherent in the challenged design outweighs 
the benefits of such design.”  (Id. at p. 430.)   
This balancing test resembled the tests suggested by Deans Wade and 
Keeton, since the word “hindsight” suggests that risk of danger should 
be measured at the time of trial—not when the product was 
manufactured or distributed.  We went beyond Keeton and Wade, 
however, by holding that “once the plaintiff makes a prima facie 
showing that the injury was proximately caused by the product’s design, 
the burden should appropriately shift to the defendant to prove, in light 
of the relevant factors, that the product is not defective.”  (Id. at pp. 
431.)  Professors James Henderson and Aaron Twerski (later to become 
Reporters for the Restatement (Third) of Products Liability), have 
written that our “formulation of the prima facie case for defective design 
smacks of defect-free liability.”  (Henderson & Twerski, Closing the 
American Products Liability Frontier: The Rejection of Liability Without 
Defect (1991) 66 N.Y.U. L.Rev. 1263, 1292 (hereafter Henderson and 
Twerski, American Products).) 
Paradoxically, in recent years scholars, including Henderson and 
Twerski, have seen a return to a negligence-like standard in design 
defect cases, including our cases.  (Henderson & Twerski, Stargazing: 
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The Future of American Products Liability Law (1991) 66 N.Y.U. 
L.Rev. 1332.)  Indeed, under the guidance of Henderson and Twerski as 
Reporters, the Restatement of Torts (Third): Products Liability has 
adopted a negligence-like standard as its design defect test.  (See Rest. 
3d Torts, Products Liability (1998) § 2(b).)  This standard, however, is 
inconsistent with our case law. 
In our 1994 case of Soule v. Gen. Motors Corp. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 548, 
34 Cal.Rptr.2d 607, 882 P.2d 298, we were asked by GM and the 
Products Liability Advisory Council as amicus curiae to abandon both 
Barker’s consumer expectation test and its shifting of the burden of 
proof under the excessive preventable danger test—and thus return 
products liability to negligence principles.  We declined this invitation in 
Soule and, thereby, once again affirmed that strict products liability was 
intended to be and is more expansive than negligence law.  We retained 
(while refining) the consumer expectation test and left intact Barker’s 
excessive preventable danger test, with its shifting of the burden of 
proof. 
This review of our products liability decisions demonstrates that over 
the years we have sought to develop a body of law that is more 
expansive than negligence law, but, because of the defect requirement, 
does not impose an absolute liability.  This review also demonstrates that 
the attempt to achieve this middle ground often results in confusion 
between our strict liability doctrine and negligence law.  This confusion 
(and attendant litigation and expense) is one reason why we are 
abandoning the defect requirement in our supermarket enterprise liability 
doctrine—in addition to the fundamental policies of victim 
compensation, loss spreading, and optimal safety initiatives. 
To avoid confusion, however, we wish to reiterate that defectiveness 
remains a requirement in the realm of products liability law.  Without 
exploring whether the policy justifications we have pointed to support 
the contention of some torts scholars that at least some products are 
suited to a regime of absolute liability, see, e.g., Croley & Hanson, 
Rescuing the Revolution, supra, at p. 683, we wish to emphasize 
practical and policy reasons why cases governed by our supermarket 
enterprise liability doctrine differ fundamentally from products liability 
cases—and thus why we are confident of the soundness of our defect-
free enterprise liability doctrine. 
Professors Henderson and Twerski have asserted that the 
“abandonment of the traditional defect requirement . . . is one significant 
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step in the evolution of American products liability that our courts will 
never take.”  (Henderson & Twerski, American Products,, supra, at pp. 
1329–1330.)  They point to the fact that in many accidents more than 
one product is causally involved.  This raises the problem of how to 
allocate liability among automobile, truck, bicycle, and telephone pole 
manufacturers in an accident involving all of these products.  (Id. at p. 
1280.)  Absent a defect requirement, liability would seem to attach to 
any product manufacturer whose product is causally related to the injury.  
However, in this hypothetical the manufacturers of each product 
mentioned are causally related to the injury.  If liability is not to be 
imposed on all of these (and perhaps other) manufacturers, how does one 
single out the appropriate manufacturer?  The dilemma raised by 
Henderson and Twerski is not a trivial one.  Indeed, it applies also to 
proposals to extend no-fault insurance to product accidents, as Jeffrey 
O’Connell, who has made such proposals, has acknowledged.  
(O’Connell, Elective No-Fault Liability Insurance for All Kinds of 
Accidents: A Proposal (1973) 608 Ins. L.J. 495, 505.) 
However, our supermarket enterprise liability doctrine avoids the 
multiple product problem.  Like workers’ compensation plans and 
automobile no-fault liability, it looks to the specified activity or locus of 
the accident to allocate defect-free enterprise liability.  The owners of a 
supermarket (or its insurer), for example, would compensate a person 
injured even if several products are causally related to the injury. 
Supermarket cases are a more fertile ground for a no-fault enterprise 
liability than products cases for another reason.  In explaining its 
hesitancy to extend no-fault to consumer products (at least outside such 
specialized situations as prescription drugs), the ALI Reporters’ Study 
warns that there is “a crucial difference between the consumer product 
situation and the workplace . . . .  In the latter [context], the employer . . . 
made liable has ample control over the circumstances giving rise to the 
injury and is able to investigate quickly both the causes and effects of 
any injuries that occur.”  (2 ALI Reporters’ Study, supra, at p. 528.)  In 
the product context, in contrast, once a product has “left the hands of the 
manufacturer, the consumer is in control . . . and is unconstrained . . . by 
the manufacturer . . . in the risky use . . . of the product.”  (Ibid.)  
Furthermore, “the manufacturer has no ability to investigate what kinds 
or causes of injuries may have occurred until compensation claims are 
filed much later.”  (Ibid.)  Supermarket accidents are suitable for the 
application of no-fault principles because, like the employer in the 
workplace, the supermarket has “control over the circumstances giving 
rise to the injury and is able to investigate quickly both the causes and 
effects of any injuries that occur.”  (Ibid.) 
Thus the logic of the development of strict products liability—including 
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its fundamental policies—supports liability without a defect requirement 
in our supermarket enterprise liability, an approach taken for more than a 
century in hazardous activity strict liability cases.  
b.  Damages Limitations and Elimination of Victim-Fault Defenses 
As we have previously discussed, the policies that justify imposing 
strict liability (without a defect requirement) also point to the need to 
limit the damages recoverable under that doctrine—as the foundational 
enterprise liability scholarship and Justice Traynor’s Seffert opinion 
indicated.  (Seffert v. L.A. Transit Lines, supra, 56 Cal.2d at pp. 509–514, 
15 Cal.Rptr. 161, 364 P.2d 337 (dis. opn. of Traynor, J.).)  In the 
decades since Seffert, this court has pursued two distinct paths when 
deciding damages issues.  On the one hand, in routine personal injury 
cases, we have given juries wide latitude in determining the size of 
awards for pain and suffering, regarding that as a determination of fact 
initially within the province of the jury.  On the other hand, parallel to 
these decisions, a line of precedent has developed in which this court has 
restricted recovery in cases of nonpecuniary loss, exercising its 
lawmaking function, informed by considerations of policy, similar to 
those articulated by Justice Traynor in his Seffert opinion. 
In Seffert, Justice Traynor questioned the appropriateness of any 
award of pain and suffering damages in a tort system based on 
compensation and the distribution of losses through insurance, writing 
that damages for pain and suffering “become increasingly anomalous as 
emphasis shifts in a mechanized society from ad hoc punishment to 
orderly distribution of losses through insurance and the price of goods or 
of transportation.  Ultimately such losses are borne by a public free of 
fault as part of the price for the benefits of mechanization.”  (Id. at p. 
511.)  Nevertheless, in 1961, Traynor felt that the abolition of pain and 
suffering damage awards would be inappropriate for judicial action: 
“any change in this regard must await reexamination of the problem by 
the Legislature.”  (Ibid.) 
Despite this disclaimer, Justice Traynor offered a guideline that would 
have restricted the size of the award, writing that “ordinarily the part of 
the verdict attributable to pain and suffering does not exceed the part 
attributable to pecuniary losses.”  (Id. at p. 512.)  This guideline can be 
seen as an attempt to create a synthesis of previous damages reform 
proposals by Professors Jaffe, supra at 234 (need for appellate control, 
reality of attorney fees), and Plant, supra at 211 (serviceable general 
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guideline) that would be suitable for judicial adoption.  Traynor 
expressly recognized the need to consider the payment of “attorney fees 
for which plaintiffs are not otherwise compensated.”  (Id. at p. 511.)  His 
proposal of a general guideline, limiting pain and suffering damages to 
the amount of pecuniary loss, assured full plaintiff compensation—after 
payment of attorney fees—for economic loss, while giving appellate 
courts control over the size of awards.  Traynor, along with other 
enterprise liability scholars, recognized the need to link damages reforms 
with the expansion of liability.  He wrote in 1965 that “[o]nly if 
reasonably adequate compensation is assured can the law justify” 
limitations on pain and suffering damages.  (Traynor, Ways and 
Meanings, supra, at p. 376.) 
In 1977, this court began its development of a line of authority that 
questioned awards for intangible, nonpecuniary loss.  In Borer v. 
American Airlines, Inc.  (1977) 19 Cal.3d 441, 138 Cal.Rptr. 302, 563 
P.2d 858, and Baxter v. Superior Court (1977) 19 Cal.3d 461, 138 
Cal.Rptr. 315, 563 P.2d 871, we denied recovery for loss of parent-child 
consortium, citing the “strong policy reasons” that argue against 
compensation of “intangible, nonpecuniary loss.”  (Borer, supra, 19 
Cal.3d at p. 447, 138 Cal.Rptr. 302, 563 P.2d 858.)  Such losses were 
seen as “difficult to measure,” and we wrote that they “can never be 
compensated” by money damages.  (Id. at pp. 447–448.)  Moreover, “the 
burden of payment . . . must be borne by the public generally in 
increased insurance premiums or, otherwise, in the enhanced danger that 
accrues from the greater number of people who may choose to go 
without any insurance.”  (Id. at p. 447.) 
The Borer holding and rationale suggested that this court might next 
examine the propriety of awarding pain and suffering damages.  Indeed, 
Justice Mosk in his dissent in Borer pointed out that the argument that 
loss of consortium is an intangible nonpecuniary loss, which can never 
be compensated, is also applicable to pain and suffering.  (Id. at p. 454 
(dis. opn. of Mosk, J.).)  He concluded that he was “unable to 
reconcile . . . [the] settled principles [regarding pain and suffering] with 
the majority’s description of ‘the inadequacy of monetary damages to 
make whole the loss suffered.’”  (Ibid.) 
Our court’s response to this line of argument is intriguing.  First we 
stated: “[to] avoid misunderstanding, we point out that our decision . . . does 
not remotely suggest the rejection of recovery for intangible loss.”  (Id. 
at p. 447.)  Since the Borer rationale clearly does suggest precisely this, 
the most that the quoted sentence can mean is that Borer does not hold 
that all intangible losses are now disallowed.  Immediately after the 
quoted language, we then emphasized that “each claim must be judged 
on its own merits.”  (Ibid. [emphasis added].) 
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While Justice Traynor in Seffert had felt that awards of such damages 
should be curtailed, he believed that the legislature, not the court, should 
consider the substantive merits of the award.  Borer invited judicial 
consideration of the merits of the award of damages for pain and 
suffering. 
Five years after Borer, our court in 1982 did rule on the merits of 
awarding pain and suffering damages—in the context of recognizing a 
new tort cause of action.  Employing the Borer policy considerations, 
our court in Turpin v. Sortini (1982) 31 Cal.3d 220, 182 Cal.Rptr. 337, 
643 P.2d 954, held that pain and suffering damages are not recoverable 
in a child’s claim for wrongful life, although we held at the same time 
that the child may recover for specific items of economic loss, observing 
that “a monetary award of general damages . . . cannot in any 
meaningful sense compensate the plaintiff.”  (Id. at p. 237.)  
And three years after Turpin, our court approved a dollar limitation on 
pain and suffering awards in another discrete substantive area—this time 
upholding the constitutionality of the legislative cap on pain and 
suffering damages in medical malpractice cases.  In our 1985 decision in 
Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, we upheld provisions of the 
Medical Malpractice Recovery Act, including the $250,000 cap on 
noneconomic damages in medical malpractice cases.  (Fein v. 
Permanente Medical Group (1985) 38 Cal.3d 137, 211 Cal.Rptr. 368, 
695 P.2d 665.)  We rejected the claim that the cap on noneconomic 
damages denied due process, and wrote that “the Legislature possesses 
broad authority to modify the scope and nature of . . . damages.”  (Id. at 
p. 157.)  We noted that “[t]houghtful jurists [among them, Justice 
Traynor whom we quoted] . . . have for some time raised serious 
questions as to the wisdom of awarding damages for pain and suffering 
in any negligence case.”  (Id. at p. 159.)  These scholars, we wrote, had 
noted “the inherent difficulties in placing a monetary value on such 
losses, the fact that money damages are at best only imperfect 
compensation for such intangible injuries and that such damages are 
generally passed on to, and borne by, innocent consumers.”  (Ibid.  But 
compare Helfend v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 1, 
13, 84 Cal.Rptr. 173, 465 P.2d 61 [noting that policy considerations 
counseled against judicial abolition of the collateral source rule, and that 
the proposed changes, “if desirable, would be more effectively 
accomplished through legislative reform”].) 
In our 1989 decision in Thing v. La Chusa (1989) 48 Cal.3d 644, 257 
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Cal.Rptr. 865, 771 P.2d 814 (limiting causes of action for negligent 
infliction of emotional distress), we characterized our Borer decision as 
“one of policy. . . .  Crucial to the Borer decision were the intangible 
nature of the loss, the inadequacy of monetary damages to make whole 
the loss, the difficulty in measuring the damage, and the societal cost of 
attempting to compensate the plaintiff.”  (Id. at p. 665.) 
Turpin v. Sortini, supra, 31 Cal.3d 220, 182 Cal.Rptr. 337, 643 P.2d 
954, was characterized in Thing as another instance where our court had 
“recognized the need to limit recovery of monetary damages for 
intangible loss . . . .”  (Thing v. La Chusa, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 665.)  
In limiting damages to economic loss, the court in Turpin had “observed 
that ‘a monetary award of general damages . . . cannot in any meaningful 
sense compensate the plaintiff.’”  (Ibid. [quoting Turpin v. Sortini, 
supra, 31 Cal.3d at p. 237].)  In Thing, we once again utilized the 
“policy bases” of Borer—this time to limit the class of plaintiffs who can 
recover as bystanders in actions for negligent infliction of emotional 
distress.  (Id. at p. 665.) 
Thus a long line of precedent supports our consideration of the 
propriety of pain and suffering awards in the enterprise liability doctrine 
we are adopting.  Moreover, it bears emphasizing that the damages 
limitations of our supermarket enterprise liability, like those in Turpin, 
are imposed in the interest of expanding the number of accident victims 
who can receive tort compensation, with one major difference: here we 
are relieving accident victims of the need to prove negligence or defect.  
Thus this damages limitation is supported not only by the reasons 
employed in Borer, Turpin, Fein, and Thing, but also by the goal of 
providing, in the words of the ALI Reporters’ Study, the “better blend,” 
1 ALI Reporters’ Study, supra, at p. 35, of “efficient compensation, 
economical administration, and effective prevention” delivered by 
compensation plans.  (2 ALI Reporters’ Study, supra, at p. 534.  See 
also Traynor, Ways and Meanings, supra, at p. 376.) 
Turpin was not the first case in which we have, for policy reasons, 
limited damages while significantly expanding the number of plaintiffs 
who could be compensated through the tort system.  In abolishing the 
defense of contributory negligence, our 1975 decision in Li v. Yellow 
Cab Co. (1975) 13 Cal.3d 804, 119 Cal.Rptr. 858, 532 P.2d 1226, did 
just that by allowing negligent plaintiffs, previously barred from 
receiving any damages, to recover an amount reduced by their 
comparative negligence.  Our Li decision establishing comparative 
negligence rules can be seen as a first step in the judicial alteration of 
damages law, since our comparative fault rule commands a reduction in 
damages (based on plaintiff fault) in some cases.  Our supermarket 
enterprise liability doctrine affords an opportunity to build on this case 
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law and begins the process of damages reform in a discrete doctrinal 
area. 
The primary purpose of Li was to eliminate a barrier to victim 
compensation by abolishing the absolute defense of contributory 
negligence.  (See American Motorcycle Assn. v. Superior Court (1978) 
20 Cal.3d 578, 590, 146 Cal.Rptr. 182, 578 P.2d 899 [retaining joint and 
several liability and emphasizing “the practical ability of negligently 
injured persons to receive adequate compensation for their injuries.”].)  
See also Daly v. Gen. Motors Corp., supra, 20 Cal.3d 725, 144 Cal.Rptr. 
380, 575 P.2d 1162 [extending comparative negligence to strict products 
liability actions].) 
Our adoption of a comparative negligence rule, in place of the 
contributory negligence rule, was an intermediate step parallel to our 
movement from a negligence rule to a defect-dependent regime of strict 
products liability.  Today we take the next step by moving to a regime of 
supermarket enterprise liability—without a defect requirement and with 
no victim fault defenses—while directly limiting damages for intangible 
loss.  This new doctrine removes needless barriers to the swift, efficient 
compensation of accident victims.  The early precedent for our 
enterprise liability approach, including its elimination of fault-based 
defenses, is, of course, workers’ compensation legislation, and the 
desirability of eliminating fault-based defenses has long been recognized 
by enterprise liability scholars.  (See, e.g., James & Dickinson, Accident 
Proneness and Accident Law (1950) 63 Harv. L.Rev. 769; O’Connell, A 
Proposal to Abolish Contributory and Comparative Fault With 
Compensatory Savings by Also Abolishing the Collateral Source Rule 
(1979) 1979 U. Ill. L.F. 591 (hereafter O’Connell, A Proposal).)  As the 
ALI Reporters’ Study has reiterated, “little incentive to take care is lost 
when a patient (or worker [or supermarket customer]) is told that even 
though he might suffer a painful, perhaps even fatal injury, he or his 
surviving dependents will be able to recover compensation for the 
losses.”  (2 ALI Reporters’ Study, supra, at p. 511.) 
4.  The Specifics of Supermarket Enterprise (No-Fault) Liability 
a.  The Limitation to Supermarkets 
The rationale supporting supermarket enterprise liability could 
arguably support a broader enterprise liability, applicable to business 
premises generally.  (See Smith v. Arbaugh’s Restaurant, Inc. (D.C. Cir. 
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1972) 469 F.2d 97, 107 (conc. opn. of Leventhal, J.) [singling out 
business premises for special treatment in the context of abandoning 
traditional limitations of landowner liability].)  Alternatively, a business 
premises enterprise liability might be limited to those situations where 
the mode of operation rule has been adopted (a category broader than 
supermarkets).  This category might be defined to include self-service 
retail stores where “the proprietor could reasonably anticipate that 
hazardous conditions would regularly arise.”  (See Chiara v. Fry’s Food 
Stores, Inc. (Ariz. 1987) 733 P.2d 283, 285.) 
The doctrine we adopt, however, applies to supermarkets, the setting 
of the cases on appeal. This category provides a clear boundary for our 
doctrine.  This is desirable both to avoid extensive litigation over a less clear 
boundary, and because supermarkets have characteristics that may not be 
shared by other businesses that might be covered by a broader doctrine. 
Supermarkets create specific types of hazards and have established 
claims reporting and handling procedures that should provide useful data 
in our practical determination of specific damages rules (as we discuss 
below).  The precedent for limiting a new strict (in this case enterprise) liability 
rule to a small subset of a broader category of cases is, of course, the 
foods products cases, where strict liability was applied prior to our 
development of the modern doctrine of strict products liability.  (See, e.g., 
Ryan v. Progressive Grocery Stores, Inc. (N.Y. 1931) 175 N.E. 105, 106.) 
b.  Development of Damages Rules 
While, as we have discussed, the need, policy bases, and judicial 
precedent for damages reforms are clear, we recognize that the specifics 
of those reforms are crucial.  We also recognize that in deciding those 
specifics, we are breaking new ground.  Finally, we recognize that a 
common theme among leading judges of recent decades is that judges 
too often make insufficient systematic inquiry into what Professor 
Kenneth Culp Davis called “legislative facts,” and, more importantly, 
have failed to employ procedures that could increase their access to such 
facts and provide various interested parties with an ability for input in 
this process.  (See Posner, The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory 
(1999) xiii; Friendly, The Courts and Social Policy: Substance and 
Procedure (1978) 33 U. Miami L.Rev. 21, 38–39; Traynor, The Limits 
of Judicial Creativity (1977) 63 Iowa L.Rev. 1, 11–12.) 
In this case, therefore, we will appoint a special master to collect data, 
hear from interested parties, analyze damages alternatives, and propose a 
damages formula consistent with the views expressed in this opinion for 
adoption by this court.  At this time, we will not spell out the details—
substantive or procedural—of this inquiry, but we will mention some 
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relevant considerations.  The first is the cost to the supermarkets and 
their insurers of the present approach to supermarket accidental injury 
and the cost that would be incurred if all negligently injured persons 
were, in fact, to receive the damages allowed under current law.  Similar 
studies of medical accidents have been conducted and are reported in the 
ALI’s Reporters’ Study.  (See 2 Reporters’ Study, supra, at pp. 491–
492.)  Court files and, when available, claims, settlement, and accident 
data from supermarket records are among the sources of this information.  
In developing a damages approach under which the total cost to 
supermarkets and their insurers does not exceed a reasonable total based 
on the data collected, pecuniary loss should, of course, be given priority. 
In determining the proper measurement of damages under this new 
enterprise liability, consideration should be given to the pioneering 
efforts by scholars, including Louis Jaffe, Fleming James, Roger 
Traynor, and Jeffrey O’Connell, all cited supra, as well as approaches 
suggested by the ALI Reporters’ Study.  (See 1 ALI Reporters’ Study, 
supra, at pp. 218–229.)  Also relevant are the issues of attorneys’ fees 
and the effect of the level of damages on incentives for victims to bring 
claims.  (See Bovbjerg & Sloan, No-Fault for Medical Injury: Theory 
and Evidence (1998) 67 U.Cin. L.Rev. 53 [discussing Virginia and 
Florida no-fault plans for neurologically impaired infants with birth-
related injuries]).  See also O’Connell, A Proposal, supra, at p. 333.)  
Finally, the development of damages rules should be informed by the 
recent enactment, and implementation by the Special Master, of the 
September 11 Victim Compensation Fund.  (See Rabin, The Quest for 














NOLAN.DOC 8/22/2019  11:45 AM 
 
1242 
 
 
